State Mine Inspector Noah Young's Report To Governor B.B. Brooks For The 1908 Explosion
Of Union Pacific Coal Company's Number 0ne Mine In Hanna, Wyoming
Note: A complete list of the miners killed in the 1908 Explosion is located at the end of the report.
Office Coal Mine Inspector District No.2.
For the State of Wyoming,
Glenrock, Wyoming, July 27th, 1908
To His Excellency,
Governor Bryant B. Brooks,
SIR: In accordance with your request of March 29, 1908, to proceed to Hanna, Wyo. and make an investigation and report on the disaster in Mine No.1 of the Union Pacific Coal Company at Hanna, Wyo. in coal inspection district No.1 of David M. Elias, who met his death in said disaster, I herewith submit the following report, setting forth the details of the disaster, the probable causes of the two explosions attending the disaster, which occurred on March 28th, 1908, and such recommendations regarding the regulations of coal mines in Wyoming as will best tend to safeguard not only the property of companies but the lives of employees.
DETAILS OF THE TWO EXPLOSIONS.
The Hanna mines are among the most important coal camps in Wyoming and have an annual output of approximately 450,000 tons. The mines are owned and operated by the Union Pacific Coal company which has three mines, No. 1, 2 and 3, respectively. No. 1 was opened about nineteen years ago, No. 2 in 1904, and No. 3 in 1906. No. 1 mine has been the scene of three separate disasters - the first, a minor one occurring the year it was opened; the second on June 30th, 1903, when the lives of 169 miners were lost, and the third, as described below. The other mines at Hanna so far have had no disasters. The coal seams at Hanna form a basin of synclinal trough, the outcroppings or rim being similar to the rim of an oval-shaped bowl all of the sides dipping downward to a central axis running nearly northwest to southeast. All three of the mines are opened on the western side of this bowl or trough; mine No. 2 being on the west, No. 3 on the east and No. 1 occupying a central position between the two. The coal basin is about six miles long by east and west by two miles wide. Mine No. 1 was first opened on the west side of the basin by a slope from the outcrop. A large extent of territory was opened up reaching to the bottom of the basin and extending a small distance up the eastern slope. To facilitate the work of the coal on this side the east slope was built to connect in a straight line with the west slope. At the time of the 1903 disaster the two slopes were separated by about 400 feet of coal. The east slope was provided with merely a hoist and fan as no coal was hauled out except to supply the boilers. The output of the colliery was hauled up the west slope to a tipple located there because of the nearness of the railroad tracks. All of the coal mined in the entries on the east slope were lowered to the bottom of the basin where trips were made up and pulled up the west side slope. The coal seam varies from 12 to 15 feet in thickness and averages about 12 feet of workable coal. It is of the lignite variety and high in volatile matter and fairly friable. The mine has always been gaseous, a series of small mine fires resulting from spontaneous combustion being part of the mine’s history. The mine is damp, and all of the entries have pipe lines for wetting down, so that coal dust has not, in my opinion, been responsible for the fires. For several years before the 1903 explosion, part of the mine was on fire which smoldered behind air-tight bulkheads. The explosion cost the lives of 169 miners and was probably caused by the breaking out of gas and its ignition by a blown-out shot. These bulkheads or stoppings were what is known as single stoppings and were constructed of wood. The mine was opened up shortly after this disaster and operated continuously up to the time of the recent catastrophe. Entries No. 8 and 10, which were connected with the recent disaster, extend south from the east slope a distance of about 1,600 feet. No rooms had as yet been started from these entries. It was on Sunday, the 22nd, at 1 o’clock in the morning that the night fire boss discovered a fire near the face of the upper entry of No. 10, which had been started probably by a shot. The true cause of this fire will probably never be known as no witnesses are now left. Entry No. 10 was walled off with stoppings placed just inside the first slant near the mouth of the entry. On Thursday, the 26th, the haulage way stoppage was advanced 200 feet to a point just beyond the first cross-cut. The mine force of 200 odd miners was idle on this day and on the following Saturday, the 28th, the day of the explosion. On Saturday Superintendent Briggs with a picked force of 17 men proceeded to attack the fire in No. 10 entry. This force comprised of men noted for their skill and experience in fighting fire. It thus constituted the flower of the camp contributed by the three company mines. Just what method was adopted will never be known. Mr. E. O. Christiansen, mining engineer on the U. P. Coal company and a survivor of the disaster, however, who was present at a meeting held the night before when plans were discussed, believes that the following method was adopted; The stoppage in the haulage way was probably first taken out and advanced a distance of about 600 feet beyond the second slant when the slant stoppage was removed to permit the air current passing down the entry and through the cross-cuts to carry out the impure air. Possibly in the process of carrying the third stopping forward to complete the work of walling off the fire at the point about 800 feet from the mouth of the entry, the men were overcome with white-damp, giving time for the air to come in contact with the gas in too great a quantity and thus forming an explosive mixture. At least four of the party, however, (Monson, Warburton, and Parry, gas men at the three mines, and Raimey, the rope runner) had some warning, for their bodies were found on the No. 10 entry parting or where No. 10 entry leaves the main slope. They were probably on their way to join the others when feeling the air blast from the explosion, they threw themselves face downward. Some idea of the force of the explosion, which should have readily shown to any experienced mining man that no one could possibly have been alive in the mine, is gained from the fact that several twelve foot timbers - a foot in diameter, which had been securely wedged in rock - were blown out against the tipple from 300 to 400 feet from the mouth, and a timber, measured by myself, and which was 15 inches in diameter, was blown a distance of between 400 and 500 feet, falling near the boiler plant. The solid earth and rock on top of these timbers, forming the top of the slope, was lifted up a distance of at least 15 feet and fell back, forming a mass of debris about 25 feet in depth. The east slope was not greatly injured, although it is important to know that most of the stoppings, with the exception of one or two, were blown out. The blowing out of these stoppings let out into the in-take air course or main entry deadly gases which were carried down the slope and came in contact with the blazing furnace at No. 10 entry, causing the second explosion. David M. Elias, inspector of District No. 1, who was traveling west on train No. 3 en route to Rock Springs at the time of the explosion, was notified by telegraph, and reached the scene of the disaster about an hour after it occurred. He arrived about 4 P.M. Every person of authority had been killed in the first explosion and up to the time of the arrival of Elias, there appears to have been no leader. Previous to his arrival it seems that Joseph Woods, the sole surviving fire boss out of six, attempted some organization of the rescuers. Leaving a man at the first entry to prevent others from following, until conditions were ascertained, Woods, accompanied by several others, penetrated as far as the 10th entry. At this point, however, he was overcome by fire-damp and carried out. The guard left at the first entry, however, was not equal to the occasion as he went below and was killed by the second explosion. When Elias arrived, all looked to him as the leader of the rescuers. His task was made doubly difficult by the loss of all persons in authority known to the men, who could have compelled obedience. Inspector Elias evidently needed a man who would enforce orders, but the man he selected failed him. After starting the repaired west slope fan, the east slope fan having been run continuously, Inspector Elias with a party of ten men started down the east slope probably about 5:30 P.M. The man left behind on the surface at the head of the slope with strict instructions from Inspector Elias to allow no one to go below, later yielded to the pressure of excited would-be rescuers and went below with them. After that, apparently, any one and every one passed at will up and down the slope into the mine. It is now apparent that more than 50 men must have followed the inspector’s party into the mine streaming along down the slope in groups without a leader, without order and without a plan of concerted action. It is natural, from these conditions, to expect conflicting reports from the men who went into the mine and narrowly escaped death in the second explosion.
EXPLOSIONS – THEIR CAUSES AND PREVENTATIVES
That the first explosion could have been avoided by proper care on the part of the officials of the Union Pacific Coal company is evident in my opinion. It was undoubtedly due to the desire of the officials to open up this entry as speedily as possible. According to the evidence of Joseph Woods the fire in No. 10 entry (where the first explosion occurred) broke out on the morning of March 22nd and was walled off with single wood stoppings. This entry, like No. 8, was a new entry and no rooms had as yet been opened from it. The opening of this entry would permit the working of about thirty-four rooms. Just six days after the fire had broken out an effort was made to extinguish the fire by forcing the stoppings backward towards the face of the entry. In my opinion, and I believe in this every experienced coal miner in the state will concur, the only safe method to have adopted was to wall off No. 10 entry with double stone stoppings and left it for 30 or 60 days, in which time the fire would have been completely extinguished and the entry could have been re-opened without danger to property or the lives of the miners. The construction of stone stoppings is required by the laws of Wyoming. I state that the fire would have been extinguished in from 30 to 60 days by proper stopping because no rooms had been opened along this entry. It is generally understood that fire existed, prior to the explosions of March 28th, in entry No. 10 only. My investigations revealed the fact that fire also existed in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 entries and probably in entries on the west slope. The fire in No. 3 entry had been walled off but four days before the explosion, while those in Nos. 1 and 2 had been built last September. All of these fires were walled off by wooden stoppings instead of stone in DIRECT VIOLATION of the laws of the state. It seems to me, after the experience of the 1903 disaster, that the officials of the mine would have taken proper precautions against the fires in their abandoned entries and walled them off with stone stoppings, with sand between, and a third wall about 30 feet distant, even if they did not construct the legal stoppings. No.1 mine is a highly-gaseous colliery and such mines require double or triple the precautions needed for the ordinary mine. A fire properly walled off, and protected by stone stoppings, ceases to be an element of danger compared with wooden stoppings even in cases of explosions in other parts of the mine. It is my belief that the first explosion was caused by the negligence of the mine officials in not waiting a proper time before opening No. 10 entry. The second explosion was the direct result of the conditions created by the first explosion. That is, the blowing out of the stoppings which let out the deadly gases from the abandoned entries, and the creation of a roaring furnace and consequent terrific draft which drew the gases down the in-take course until they came in contact with the flames. It is probable the second explosion could have been avoided by erecting stoppings at the mouth of the entries as the men advanced down into the mine and by erecting a stopping in the west slope. This would have shut off the supply of fresh air rushing toward the fire in No. 10 entry, and an explosion could not have occurred unless this fresh air and gas, in the proportion of 9 to 1, came in contact with the flames. That is, the gas being carried down to the fire would not have exploded unless it had at least nine parts of fresh air in combination with it.
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN MINE.
On July 8th a conference was held at Hanna by the state coal mine inspectors of Wyoming and Utah, the officials of the Union Pacific Coal Company and representatives of the miners union for the purpose of formulating a plan for the re-opening of the mine to rescue the bodies. The following committee was appointed which drafted plans for the opening; John Mates, Noah Young, John McNeil, Morgan Griffiths, M. E. Harvey, Jos Bird and J. E. Pettit. The east slope was opened the following day, and the slope penetrated to the first cross cut a distance of 100 feet. One body was recovered, but on account of the presence of deadly gases, the slope was then walled up together with the return air course, and the debris in the mouth of the slope removed. The committee was then discharged, but I have learned that since then, on July 17th, the stoppings were forced further down the slope and thirteen bodies were recovered. It was impossible to proceed further and the mine was again sealed up.
LOSSES FROM DISASTER.
The total casualties from the disaster were fifty-nine. Eighteen men met death in the first explosion and forty-one in the second explosion. By the disaster, thirty-one widows were created and one hundred and three children were left fatherless. The property loss was great and it is probable the mine will remain sealed as a tomb for those who met death in the explosions and whose bodies have not yet been recovered. A mine of this kind, highly-gaseous, and with many abandoned entries full of gases and smoldering fires would, if opened, be a constant menace to the lives of all men employed therein and the mine could not be worked without a strong prospect of another disaster. Moreover, it is probable, if the mine was re-opened, that many bodies would never be recovered, in which case the relatives of the victims would never by certain, in any case, whether they had interred the remains of their own dead or not.
JOSEPH WOODS STATEMENT,
Below is given verbatim the statement of Joseph Woods, the only surviving fire boss of No. 1 mine, made before myself in Cheyenne on July 25th;
Q. About what time did the first explosion take place?
A. About 3 o'clock, March 28th, 1908.
Q. How many were killed in the first explosion?
A. Eighteen.
Q. Were both fans running when Elias went into the mine?
A. Yes.
Q. When Elias went down to 8 and 10 entries about how much air do you think was going down the slope?
A. As much or more than usual.
Q. How many were killed in the second explosion?
A. Forty-one.
Q. Is it not a fact that all of the stoppings were blown out by the first explosion?
A. With the exception of one or two.
Q. How many fire bosses were taking care of the mine at the time of the explosion?
A. Six.
Q. Is it not a fact that some of these six were laid off during idle days?
A. Yes, only three worked on idle days.
Q. How long was it after the last examination of fire bosses that fire was discovered in No. 10 entry?
A. Twenty-four hours.
Q. How many stone stoppings were there in the slope. I mean on the main line of the slope, or in fact in the mine?
A. None on the east side. Only about three or four in the Mine.
Q. Was there fire in 1, 2 and 3 entries at the times of the explosion, and was not the same built off?
A. Yes.
Q. About how long was the fire in 1, 2 and 3 entries built off before the explosion took place?
A. The 3 fire was built off about four days before the explosion.
Q. Did you ask Elias how fast the west side fan was running, and what did he say to you
A. Yes, I asked him and he said he did not know.
Q. Did you not tell Elias not to go down to 8 and 10 entries?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he make any reply to the same?
A. No.
Q. Is it not a fact that he made two trips down there?
A. Yes.
Q. How many entries and stoppings had you blocked off when Elias went down No. 2 entry?
A. Four cross-cuts and No. 2 entry. The balance were open.
Q. Did you hear Elias speaking of building off No. 8 entry?
A. Yes, he suggested it.
Q. Was there any organization, or rather did Elias organize his men before entering the mine?
A. No.
Q. Was there not fire on the west side?
A. Yes, there was supposed to be fire in all of them that were abandoned on the west side.
Q. These stoppings that were built before the explosion, were they built double or single; that is were the stoppings built with three feet of sand between the two?
A. The stoppings were built single.
Q. What material was the stoppings built of?
A. Wooden blocks.
Q. About how long?
A. They were round props about two and a half feet long.
Q. Are there regular men employed for firing shots in the mine?
A. Yes.
Q. These shots are fired when men are working in the mine?
A. Yes.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
There are three principal causes for mine explosions - fire-damp, powder explosions, and dust. It can be inferred from experience that the combination of circumstances which make an explosion possible is comparatively rare, and when they do occur, except in the case where unforeseen accidents occur, they are the direct result of negligence on the part of some one or ignorance of the three elements of danger mentioned above. While these three causes exist, as they always will, it is probable mine explosions will occur, but a through knowledge of their properties and methods of prevention will go far towards eliminating disasters. Causes that are unknown, and which probably exist, cannot be controlled, but when causes are known the frequency of disasters will be in direct ratio to the knowledge of the mine operators of such causes and the rigidness with which regulations are enforced. It is imperative, also, that not only these causes be studied and thoroughly understood, but as well that they be comprehended when in combination. For instance, while mine air in which no gas can be detected by the ordinary safety lamp is considered safe for all practical purposes, this gas may be an element of great danger if complicated with the two other causes, as the explosion of a shot. The gas itself may be harmless but may become a powerful instrument of destruction if acted upon by the force of a heavy shot fired with black powder. Again, the gas acted upon by the force of powder may still not prove dangerous unless the presence of dust added to presence of gas creates a combination of all three causes resulting in an explosion. In this connection I recommend the removal of the accumulated dust in coal mines at least once a week. At the present time the dust on the floor of the mines is sprinkled with water, but no attempt is made to sprinkle the dust on the sides and roof, which only partially eliminates the danger. I earnestly urge that the following system of sprinkling be made a law; that in all mines sprinkling cars shall be used which shall be equipped with pumps and hand nozzles, and that not only the bottom, but the sides and roof of the mine shall be thoroughly saturated. This will tend to eliminate almost entirely the possibility of explosions from mine dust.
METHOD OF WORKING.
While it may be difficult to legislate against the present dangerous method of opening and working mines, I incorporate the following remarks to show Your Excellency that by the present system the demand for the immediate production of coal has resulted and is resulting, not only in the partial ruination of many mines in Wyoming, but also, in subjecting the employees to danger in order that coal may at once be placed upon the market. This system is knows as “gouging” or “taking out the foundation of a mine.” That is, the production of coal begins as soon as a mine is opened. Entries and rooms are opening up off the main slope and gradually the mine is extended downwards along the coal seam. Under this system, at all times, the miners are working BELOW the worked out and gaseous entries and are in constant danger. Under this system probably 50 per cent of the coal is lost as in many cases parts of the coal seam have to be abandoned on account of “squeezes” of the general sinking of the mine. The proper method of opening up a coal mine is to run the main slope and entries down to the bottom of the synclinal trough and then working out the coal UPWARDS. In England as long as from one to two years has been devoted to the running of the main slope and entries before the production of coal begins. Perhaps no mine in America was better suited to this system of working than the Hanna No.1 mine in which the recent disaster occurred. In this mine the coal at the bottom of the “basin” should have been worked out first, and the abandoned entries and rooms filled with water as the work of taking out the coal proceeded upwards. At no time would the miners have been below entries filled with gas and the entire seam could have been worked without a single explosion or in the face of any great danger.
PROPER USE OF POWDER.
Every miner knows it is not uncommon for one man to shoot 3 or 4 holes and burn, say 20 pounds of powder, at a single firing. In a mine putting out 1,000 tons of coal a day and employing, say 400 miners, there would be set free at firing time about 50,000 cubic feet of gases by the combustion of four tons or 8,000 pounds powder, which is the day's consumption in the case assumed, would develop 2,880,000 foot tons of energy, or produce a force capable of hurling the entire day’s output of coal - a thousand tons - a distance of over half a mile - 2,880 feet. The power developed in blasting in a large mine is simply stupendous; it is beyond our comprehension. The excessive use of powder in a mine is a wrong both to the miner and his fellow workmen, and a menace to the safety of the mine. An overcharge of powder in blasting reduces much of the coal to screening, while a considerable portion of the finer sizes and dust are wholly lost in loading and transportation before reaching the tipple where the product is weighed and credit given the miner. Nor does the evil stop with the loss that falls to the miner from producing so large a percentage of fine coal and dust; the haulage way and workings and indeed all parts of the mine are strewn with the small coal and dust. On the roads and timbers and in the air courses and at working face, the presence of the dust is a danger that no miner fully comprehends. While I cannot here more fully explain the nature of these dangers in mines, it may be stated with emphasis that under certain possible conditions that occur only too frequently in mine workings the fine dust thrown into suspension in the air by the concussion of a windy shot or the force of a blown out shot develops in the flame of the blast to which it is subjected an energy 15 times as great as that of black blasting powder or more than 5,600 foot tons per pound of dust. No miner who has even a vague comprehension of what these figures mean can be indifferent to the proper use of explosives in the blasting coal. A result of this much powder being consumed often produces what is called a windy shot or a heavy concussion of the mine air; the action started by such an occurrence being often disastrous and increasing in violence, develops in a short space of time, under favorable conditions, sufficient energy to form a dust explosion that may be propagated throughout the mine. Every miner should be an expert in the use of his pick. It is only by the proper use of the pick that the best results are obtained in blasting coal in most seams. There are some seams, it is true, that are best worked by blasting the coal off the solid; that is to say, there is no pick work, no side cutting or undercutting of the coal. The coal is excavated by the use of the drill and powder alone. Again, there are other seams where no powder is used, the excavating being done by the pick and the natural weighting of the roof, which breaks the coal from the seam. A good miner knows how and when to use his pick and does not fail to do so when occasion requires. Some so-called coal miners, however, either from choice or through ignorance, profess to believe that work in a coal mine is similar to that in a stone quarry. This is the greatest mistake a miner can make and often brings disaster and untold misery to all at work in the mine. For the sake of others, if not his own, every miner using powder should study carefully the principles involved in blasting. A knowledge of these principles applied daily to his work will increase not only his output but the general safety of the mine. I recommend the passage of a law providing that all shots in coal mines should be fired by competent men and that they should be fired when all men are out of the mine. I also urge the importance of passing a law providing for the use of “flameless” powder instead of black powder in blasting in coal mines, particularly of a gaseous nature. Black powder should be entirely eliminated in such mines as flameless powder will not ignite gas or dust even with a blown out shot. While “flameless” powder cannot be called a safety powder, it certainly would eliminate to a great extent the dangers accompanying the use of black powder.
CROSS-CUTS IN MINES.
Under the mining laws of Wyoming, enacted some years ago, it is provided that in coal mines cross-cuts shall be constructed not more than 16 yards or 48 feet apart. My investigation of the Hanna disaster resulted in the discovery, and this is verified by E. O. Christiansen, mining engineer of the U. P. Coal Company, that in No. 10 entry, where the explosion occurred, the cross-cuts were spaced at 200-foot intervals for the first 800 feet in from the slope, and at 100-foot intervals for the remaining 800 feet of the entry. While this did not affect in any way the occurrence of the explosion, it demonstrated that the company was not obeying the provisions of the state mining laws. The carrying out of this provision is important as the spacing of cross-cuts at longer distances than 16 yards compels the miners to work too far away from the fresh air courses and is a great element of danger. In gaseous mines, such as the Hanna No. 1, the running of cross-cuts at distances of 100 and 200 feet, as was done in entry No. 10, was a menace to the miners employed on this work and was in direct violation of the statutes of Wyoming. This provision of the law should be rigidly enforced at all times.
INSTRUMENTS IN MINES.
I recommend the use - in coal mines in Wyoming of a gaseous nature - of thermometers, which will show the temperature of the air; of barometers, which will show the atmospheric pressure, and anemometers which will show the current of fresh air. The proper use of these instruments will tend greatly to reduce the danger and indicate the presence of dangerous gases and at all times the conditions existing in the mine.
USE OF FIRE BOSSES.
As the result of my investigation of the Hanna disaster, it was discovered that on idle days, or on days when the regular force of employees was not at work, the number of fire bosses employed was reduced from six to three. This, in my opinion, is criminal negligence. When all of the regular force is at work each miner becomes an inspector or fire boss and will report the presence of gas in the mine, so that the work of the fire bosses is rendered more certain and effective. It is apparent that on idle days the work of fire bosses becomes all the more important, as they must cover just as great an area of ground or territory and ascertain if the mine is in safe condition as on busy days, without the assistance of the miners. I believe it is imperative that a law should be passed providing that the number of fire bosses should not be less on idle days than on busy days, unless the mine is closed down for an indefinite period of time.
STONE STOPPINGS IN MINES.
In my opinion there has been considerable laxity in carrying out the provisions of the Wyoming law in regard to the construction of stone stoppings in coal mines. The Wyoming law provides for a single stone stopping and yet, in many cases, single wooden stoppings have been used instead. In the northern district in Wyoming every gaseous mine has been equipped, or is being equipped, as rapidly as possible with stone stoppings, and the law, in this regard, carried out. In the Dietz mine No. 2, a highly gaseous mine, the operators are not only conforming to the state law, but going even further and to protect their property and lives of their employees, are erecting triple stone stoppings with a double layer of stone and sand between and third stone wall from 20 to 30 feet distance. This makes it as safe as can be obtained by the best modern methods in mining. From the information I obtained from Fire Boss Joseph Woods and others, I discovered that in the Hanna mine No. 1, in which the recent explosion occurred, there were but three or four stone stoppings in the entire mine. Whether or not this would have mitigated the severity of the explosion is a matter of conjecture, but the evidence at least indicates that the state law requiring stone stoppings was not obeyed by the mine operators. I desire to impress upon your Excellency the importance of urging the strictest conformity to this provision of our mining laws.
Respectfully,
________________________________________
State Coal Mine Inspector Dist. No. 2.
Names of those who lost their lives in the two
Explosions at Hanna Mine Number One of the Union Pacific
Coal Company, March 28, 1908
Explosions at Hanna Mine Number One of the Union Pacific
Coal Company, March 28, 1908
First explosion – about three o’clock, PM
Alexander Briggs -- Superintendent Robert Warburton -- Boss Driver
Joseph Burton -- Mine Foreman Gus Raimey -- Rope Runner
John B. Evans -- Gas Watchman P. A. Boyd -- Pumper
James Knox -- Gas Watchman John Ikonen -- Rollerman
John Rimmer -- Gas Watchman Pete Munson -- Pipeman
Harry Lyon -- Gas Watchman Emil Silfast -- Timberman Helper
Ben Parry -- Gas Watchman Gabe Lahte -- Timberman
Robert Herrin -- Gas Watchman Thomas Flint -- Mason
Alfred Dodds -- Mine Foreman 2 W. H. Pascoe -- Gas Watchman
Second explosion, about ten thirty o’clock PM
A. Madden -- Shot Firer C. X. Hughes -- Miner
James Tyner -- Miner Harry Foster -- Laborer
T. D. Penn -- Miner Mat Joki -- Miner
Elmer Johnson -- Miner John Cookson -- Driver
William Joki -- Miner Alfred Halliday -- Laborer
Alex. Tennant -- Miner James Larson -- Shot Firer 2
A. C. Corley -- Miner Albert Riley -- Driver
Charley Harris -- Dumper Wm. Johnson -- Shot Firer 2
Emil Henrickson -- Driver Mat Huhtala -- Timberman
Jalmer Ollila -- Miner George Case -- Boilerman
Jonas A. Lynn -- Miner John Hoy -- Miner
Abel Pura -- Miner Andrew Hoy -- Miner
Anthony Dodds -- Boss Driver 2 H. G. Birchall -- Miner
Sam McCormick -- Laborer Andrew Birchall -- Miner
B.L. Frink -- Pumper Richard Wilson -- Ex-employee
Peter Travis -- Trackman 2 John Tate -- Shot Firer
James Smeaton -- Shot Firer 2 F. E. Collins -- Miner
William Burns -- Laborer Aug. Lakson -- Miner
John Tully -- Laborer Ensti Karrikka -- Miner
Robert Armstrong -- Rwy. Signalman F. G. Burton -- Trackman
David M. Elias -- State Coal Mine Inspector
Number in first explosion 18
Number in second explosion 41
--------
Total killed 59
Explanation of marks:
2 employed in number 2 mine, Hanna
-- Body has not been recovered from the mine.
32 bodies recovered 27 remain in the mine
Joseph Burton -- Mine Foreman Gus Raimey -- Rope Runner
John B. Evans -- Gas Watchman P. A. Boyd -- Pumper
James Knox -- Gas Watchman John Ikonen -- Rollerman
John Rimmer -- Gas Watchman Pete Munson -- Pipeman
Harry Lyon -- Gas Watchman Emil Silfast -- Timberman Helper
Ben Parry -- Gas Watchman Gabe Lahte -- Timberman
Robert Herrin -- Gas Watchman Thomas Flint -- Mason
Alfred Dodds -- Mine Foreman 2 W. H. Pascoe -- Gas Watchman
Second explosion, about ten thirty o’clock PM
A. Madden -- Shot Firer C. X. Hughes -- Miner
James Tyner -- Miner Harry Foster -- Laborer
T. D. Penn -- Miner Mat Joki -- Miner
Elmer Johnson -- Miner John Cookson -- Driver
William Joki -- Miner Alfred Halliday -- Laborer
Alex. Tennant -- Miner James Larson -- Shot Firer 2
A. C. Corley -- Miner Albert Riley -- Driver
Charley Harris -- Dumper Wm. Johnson -- Shot Firer 2
Emil Henrickson -- Driver Mat Huhtala -- Timberman
Jalmer Ollila -- Miner George Case -- Boilerman
Jonas A. Lynn -- Miner John Hoy -- Miner
Abel Pura -- Miner Andrew Hoy -- Miner
Anthony Dodds -- Boss Driver 2 H. G. Birchall -- Miner
Sam McCormick -- Laborer Andrew Birchall -- Miner
B.L. Frink -- Pumper Richard Wilson -- Ex-employee
Peter Travis -- Trackman 2 John Tate -- Shot Firer
James Smeaton -- Shot Firer 2 F. E. Collins -- Miner
William Burns -- Laborer Aug. Lakson -- Miner
John Tully -- Laborer Ensti Karrikka -- Miner
Robert Armstrong -- Rwy. Signalman F. G. Burton -- Trackman
David M. Elias -- State Coal Mine Inspector
Number in first explosion 18
Number in second explosion 41
--------
Total killed 59
Explanation of marks:
2 employed in number 2 mine, Hanna
-- Body has not been recovered from the mine.
32 bodies recovered 27 remain in the mine